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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

ROBERT LEE GRAY, the Natural
Father of David Allen Gray,
aka John Gray, Deceased,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
Case
No.
14355

vs.
BEEHIVE LODGE OF ELKS, #407, ;
I.B.P.O.E.W.; CHARLES H.
TAMPLIN; JAMES E. DOOLEY;
NATHAN WRIGHT; JAMES P. COLEMAN; ANDERSON PEARSON; ROBERT
HANDY; and ISAIAH HAWKINS,
Defendants-Respondents.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an action to recover damages for the wrongful death of
David Allen Gray, aka John Gray, a twenty (20) year old minor son of
Robert Lee Gray, plaintiff.

The plaintiff alleges the respondents

were negligent in not providing adequate security to protect the decedent against dangers which respondents should reasonably have foreseen and anticipated would exist during a New Year's Eve Celebration
on December 31, 1973, and January 1, 1974, at the premises of the
Beehive Lodge of Elks, #407, I.B.P.O.E.W., located at 248 West South
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pie Street, Salt Lake City, Utah,

The defendant Beehive Lodge of

s is being sued under its common name pursuant to Rule 17(d) of the
h Rules of Civil Procedure and the individual defendants are offis and trustees of the said unincorporated association.

The ori-

ial action also involved a defendant Galveston Sonny Scott whom
s plaintiff alleges fired the fatal shot which killed David Allen
Ly the minor decedent.

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The case was tried before the Honorable G. Hal Taylor sitting
th a jury of eight (8) members on October 21, 22, 24, 28, 29, 30,
3 31, 1975.

[R. 74-80].

The jury returned its verdict finding in

vor of the Beehive Lodge of Elks #407, I.B.P.O.E.W., and against
e plaintiff, "no cause of action."

The jury also found in favor

the plaintiff and against the defendant Galveston Sonny Scott and
sessed damages as follows:

Special Damages: $1,100.00; General

mages: $15,000.00; Punitive Damages: $15,000.00; for a total of
1,100.00.

[R. 212-213].

Thereafter, on November 28, 1975, the

aintiff filed its Notice of Appeal appealing from that certain
udgment on Verdict" which awarded the plaintiff NO CAUSE OF ACTION
ainst the defendant Beehive Lodge of Elks #407, I.B.P.O.E.W. [R. 227:9].

The plaintiff did not appeal from that separate "Judgment on

jrdict" which awarded judgment to the plaintiff and against the deindant Galveston Sonny Scott in the amount of $31,100.00. No cross
>peals were filed.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

The appellant seeks to reverse the judgment appealed from and
to have this Honorable Supreme Court order a new trial for the plaintiff on all issues involving the defendant Beehive Lodge of Elks #407,
I.B.P.O.E.W. and the individual officers and trustees of the said
l o d g e .

. • • • . ' • • • !

, -

•

. i

*

:

• .

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The plaintiff is the natural father of one David Allen Gray,
aka John Gray, deceased.

[R. 640].

*

David Allen Gray was born

on February 9, 1953, and died from a gunshot wound sometime about
2:00 a.m. on January 1, 1974, during a New Year's Eve Celebration held
on the premises of the Beehive Lodge of Elks #407, I.B.P.O.E.W., at
248 West South Temple, Salt Lake City, Utah.

[Ex. 13 - P ] .

At the

said time and place, the premises at 248 West South Temple were leased
and operated by the Beehive Lodge of Elks.

[R. 489-491] .

This par-

ticular New Year's Eve Celebration was open to any members of the
public who could pay the five dollar ($5.00) cover charge; and no ~
one was turned away for any reasons other than the premises were full
to capacity.

[R. 505, 507-508].

At the time of the shooting, the

decedent was a business invitee upon the premises and had a membership card to the said lodge on his person at the time of his death.
[R. 726-727].

The jury found the issues in favor of the plaintiff and

against the defendant Galveston Sonny Scott and assessed damages of
$31,100.00 against Scott.

[R. 953] .

This verdict implies a find-

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J.
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that Scott shot and killed David Allen Gray as will be developed
more detail and for which finding there was ample evidence.
The defendant Beehive Lodge of Elks #407f I.B.P.O.E.W., is an
.ncorporated association in the State of Utah and was registered
:h the Salt Lake City License Department.

[R. 494. Ex. 22-P].

i individual defendants Charles H. Tamplin, James E. Dooley, Na=tn Wright, James P. Coleman, Anderson Pearson, Robery Handy, and
aiah Hawkins; were all officers of the lodge or members of the
ard of Trustees, the said unincorporated association's governing
dy and were all acting in the scope of their employment during
e conception, the planning, and organizing and the participating
the December 31, 1973, and January 1, 1974, New Year's Eve Celeation.

[R. 494-495, 552. Ex. 22-P].

The New Year's Eve Celebra-

on is an annual affair and has been held every year since 1962 at
8 West South Temple, Salt Lake City, Utah.

[R. 31. Answer to

,terrogatory No. 15].
Ex. 1-P is a schematic drawing prepared by the Salt Lake City
tgineer's Office showing the layout of the premises where the
tooting took place and Exhibits 2-P to 11-P are photographs taken
the Salt Lake City Police Department about one hour after the shooti g .

-

- ,-•

-•-.-

During the said New Year's Eve Celebration and for a year
:ior thereto, James E. Dooley, was the Exalted Ruler of the unincor>rated association.

[R. 442] . This is the highest elected official

: the local Beehive Lodge of Elks.

[R. 442]. Mr. Dooley admitted

-4Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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there had been five or six fracases each year at the Beehive Lodge
of Elks.

[R. 481] .

He further testified that sometime less than

three (3) months prior to the New Year's Eve Celebration there was
a fracas that had taken place between two (2) people who were
gambling in the basement of the Beehive Lodge of Elks.

This fracas

resulted in one person going out to his car, getting his gun, and
coming back and shooting the other person in the leg.

[R. 482-486].

Neither Mr. Dooley nor anyone else at the lodge stopped the card
player from going out, getting his gun, and coming back into the
lodge, going downstairs, and shooting the other card player.

[R. 496

** 497] . • One of the defendants own witnesses testified she had heard
abput this shooting and it was well known among the members.

[R. 84!

849, 891]. Mr. Dooley stated the Board of Trustees barred the person*
involved from the premises.

[R. 486]. He said other people had

been barred from the premises for conduct unbecoming or bad conduct
or rowdiness or for other broad reasons.
-

;

[R. 486-487] .

After the gambling shoot out, Mr. Dooley asked Anderson Pear-

son to get some special training and instructions downtown on how
to perform his duties as a security guard and how to police the area
during the time of the New Year's Eve Celebration.

[R. 409-410].

Mr. Pearson testified'this request was made approximately one (1)
month before the said celebration.

[R. 409-410].

Mr., Pearson ad-

mitted he had never received any instruction as to what to do in
the event there were guns and shootings and/or knifings present.
[R. 408] .

He admitted he failed to follow the request of Mr. Dooley

and never did get the special instruction.

[R. 410-412].

Mr. Pear-

son was a member of the lodge's Board of Trustees [Ex. 22-P, R. 405Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

7]; and was also a member of the lodge's internal security division
own as the Antlered Guard - one of whose purposes was to provide
curity for a function such as the New Year's Eve Celebration.
.."32-33/ 389/ 407-411/ 466. Answer to Interrogatories Nos. 18,
/ 20/ 21/ and 22]. During the New Year's Eve Celebration, Mr.
arson testified he was given the specific duty to police the area,
eak-up arguments, break-up fights, and to bring peace to the fes.vities.

[R. 408-409].

He stated that to the best of his know-

>dge, he was the only one on the premises to keep order.

[R. 408].

The New Year's Eve Celebration took place on Monday and Tuesly, December 31/ 19 73, and January 1, 1974. Less than forty-eight
18) hours prior to the celebration, and in early morning hours of
jnday, December 30, 19 73, there was another fight and shoot out
i and about the premises.

[R. 736-746].

le defendant Galveston Sonny Scott, David

This shoot out involved
Allen Gray and Blood or

Dungblood - the same three persons who were involved in the New '<
ear's Eve shooting.

[R. 736-746].

The fighting occurred during

regular Saturday night dance which Mr. Dolley testified was in
11 respects about the same atmosphere, number in attendance, etc.,
s the New Year's Eve Celebration.

[R. 492-494].

The fight appa-

ently started over some verbal exchanges involving the participants
espective girlfriends.

[R. 561-563].

After the fight, David Allen

ray and Blood went outside to get some firearms and some of the
efendant Galveston Sonny Scott's friends found him a weapon.
63-564, 579-580].

[R.

Scott then went outside and within a few minutes

;here was a typical "Dodge City-type shoot out" behind the parked
:ars, etc., with rifles, and revolvers furnishing the sound effects.
P- 564. 481-4831 .
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This shooting took place about 1:00 a.m. on Sunday, December
30, 1973.

The lodge's manager, Exie Gray, broke up the fight inside

the premises and asked Galvston Sonny Scott and David Allen Gray
to take their fighting outside.

[R. 396-398, 402}. Exie Gray said

he heard about the shooting a few minutes later, but never did take
the time to find out what was going on or who did the shooting.
[R. 399-401].

One of the witnesses who attended this Saturday night

dance, said the shooting outside occurred "no more than two minuteP"
after the fight broke up inside; and she heard the shooting while
she was still inside.

[R. 786-787].

The Saturday night dance was

terminated early because of this fight between Scott and Gray.
364-366].

[R,

The bandleader said after he stopped playing, several

people came running in from outside and said there had been some
shooting.

[R. 368].

One William Middelton was present at this early Sunday morning
shoot out. He was called as a witness by the defendant Galveston
Sonny Scott.

[R. 731]. On cross-examination, he stated the fight

between Scott and Gray occurred about 1:00 a.m. Sunday, December
30, 1973.

[R. 736]. He said when Scott went outside after the

fight, he had 357 magnum revolver in his hand.

[R. 738]. Mr. Mid^

dleton testified he got in his car and drove around to the front
of the lodge where he saw Scott, Gray and many other people on the
street with guns.

[R. 738-744].

He further testified these same

people with guns had been inside the lodge attending the dance a
few minutes earlier.

[R. 769].

Exie Gray was the lodge's acting manager for both the Saturday
night dance and the New Year's Eve Celebration and was present at
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

:>oth events.

[R. 32, 283, 383, 488, 504-505].

Although he personally

Droke up the Saturday night fight between Scott and Gray; and although the dance was closed early because of the fracas, he failed
and neglected to take any steps to prevent a

recurrence of this

fighting and shooting at the New Year's Eve Celebration; even though
someone ran into the lodge to tell him about the shooting a few minutes
after it occurred.

[R. 399-401].

He further testified he did not

appear before the lodge's officers or Board of Trustees to discuss
security measures for the New Year's Eve activities, nor was he ever
asked to do so.

[R. 40 3].

Nathaniel Johnson was the lodge's chairman of the New Year's
Eve activities.

[R. 488]. He testified if he had known about the

Saturday night fight he would have

?

"Given specific instructions to the people on
the door, as well as myself. I probably would,
and I am giving you what I probably would have
done. Based on my thinking here now, I would
probably would have approached Sonny and told
him not to come to the club that night. And
then I would also have told him if I tell you
don't come and you do come, I am going to get
a Court Order and take — have the police take c
you from the premises. That's what I would do.
That's what I would do now if anybody causes a i disturbance." [R. 915].

Unfortunately, Exie Gray was not so thorough.

Had he been, the New

Year's Eve shooting may never have occurred.
Mr. Dooley testified there were no special security personnel
hired on this occasion.

[R. 501]. He further testified he had the

authority under the club's constitution to 'Appoint a policing unit,
be it a hired policing unit or whatever, at his discretion as he saw
fit,"

[R. 504]; however, he felt the lodge's volunteer Anderson

Pearson would be sufficient with extra security training.
502].

[R. 501-

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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to Jim Dooley.

[R. 4 00].

Anderson Pearson also testified Exie

Gray had told him about the Saturday night fight.

[R. 424]. How-

ever, neither Dooley nor Pearson did anything to prevent a recurrenc
of the fight or to investigate the shooting activities.

Nathaniel

Johnson testified most of the lodge's members knew Scott [R. 535]
and it would have been a simple matter for him to have passed the
word to watch for Scott, especially if Gray also happened to be on
the premises.
The minor decedent, David Allen Gray, also known as John Gray,
arrived at the Beehive Lodge of Elks premises sometime shortly after
midnight on Tuesday, January 1, 1974.

[R. 372-373].

bership card on his person at the time of his death.

He had a mem[R. 726-727.

Ex. 25-D, page 1 ] . The officers of the Beehive Lodge of Elks admitt
David Allen Gray had a right to be on the premises and they knew of
no reason why he should have been turned away.

[R. 516, 917].

Earlier on New Year's Eve, Mr. Gray had been the receipient
of some target practice cum malcum intendi by the defendant Galvesto]
Sonny Scott who fired at Gray several times with Scott's 35 7 magnum
revolver while Gray was on the sidewalk.
several shots into Gray's home.

[R. 566]. Later Scott firec

[R. 566].

Scott told his girlfrienc

the same day he killed Gray, that he had been out trying to kill
Gray that morning and the previous night.

[R. 322].

When Gray got to the Beehive Lodge of Elks, he immediately
went over to the table of one of his friends and asked if she had
seen Scott.

[R. 372-374].

When the answer was that Scott had not

been there that night, Gray appeared relieved and stayed there for
the rest of the evening until he was fatally shot.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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The defendant Scott finally found Gray at the New Year's Eve
Lebration at approximately 2:00 a.m. on Tuesday, January 1, 1974.
a detective from the Salt Lake City Police Department who got there
thin five (5) minutes after the shooting testified there were about
ree hundred (300) persons still on or about the premises.

[R. 256].

viously, the celebration was far from over. :The lodge was serving
early morning buffet-type breakfast, the band was still playing,
d people were still dancing.

[R. 339-340].

The lights were .on,

d the festivities were still very much alive. [R. 339-340].
When Scott arrived by car, he put his 357 magnum in his belt
d went in to join the party.
*ont entry way at the time.

Only one man was stationed at the
[R. 926]. The other man had left

>out Ll:30 p.m. and gone upstairs.

[R. 926, 929-930].

The man

; the door did not stop Scott to check for his membership card nor
) ask for the five dollar ($5.00) cover charge.

This doorman, a

ripple, said he "was going to have the fellows go in there and get
Lin [Scott] and bring him back out."

[R. 926] . He never did this

)wever.
As soon as Scott went into the main room, he was grabbed by
*veral people who knew him and wrestled to the floor.
Lm go when they saw his gun.

[R. 569-570].

They let

About this same time,

le bandleader announced over the public loudspeaking system there
a.s a disturbance and asked the participants to take the fight
utside.

[R. 282]. Although everyone heard this announcement,

either Anderson Pearson, James E. Dooley, Exie Gray, or any of
rie other officers of the lodge came up to see what the fighting
as all about, or to do anything to insure that it was in fact stopped
nd taken outside.

It was after several minutes this fight and announcement before
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the shooting started

[R. 281-385]; and the plaintiff alleges this

was ample time for the management to have detected the presence of
Scott and to have disarmed him.
Just before the shooting started, Scott spotted Gray at the
rear of the lodge near the back bar.

Gray was talking to a lady

friend, Brenda Bradley. [R. 311]. Apparently one Binky Coleman
joined Scott as he entered the lodge; because after the shooting
started, the witnesses described both Scott and Coleman as doing the
firing together, moving together toward the rear of the premises, *
and backing out together.

[R. 460-462] . When Scott saw Gray and

Blood at the back bar, he turned some tables over and got ready to
commence shooting.

[R. 420, 447]. Mr. Dooley testified when Scott

walked by him, Scott was only three feet (31) away.

[R. 445]. He

said Scott had a gun in his hand, but Dooley did nothing to disarm
Scott, nor to ask him to leave, nor to stop him from shooting.
[R. 445]. He simply watched Scott pick up a chair, put!.it on a tabl
and start shooting.

?

[R. 447].

^

At about this same time, the security man Anderson Pearson was
in the basement eating a sandwich.

He heard the tables being over-

turned and went upstairs to see what was happening.

[R. 418]. He

saw Scott standing by the juke boxes and identified his position with
an "X" on Exhibit 1-P.

[R. 418-419].

He had not heard any shoot-

ing at this time and was only two feet (21) away from Scott when
he first saw him.

[R. 419] . He observed Scott had a gun in his

hand which at that time was being held down at his side.

[R. 419-42(

He said he watched Scott raise his gun, say, "I am going to get that
son-of-a-bitch," and shoot toward the fear of the building where Gra]
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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d Blood were.

[R. 423]. When the shooting started, Anderson Pear-

n was afraid he might get hurt; so he went back downstairs and
ayed there until the police came downstairs and retrived him about
e-half (1/2) hour later.

[R. 419-420].

Mr. Pearson admitted he

.d not have a badge and uniform on the night of the celebration nor
.d anyone else who was present.

[R. 430]. He further admitted he

_d not have a night stick or any equipment on his person to use to
:rike anybody and make it felt or to otherwise incapacitate them.
X. 437-438].

Another member of the Antler Guard, Sylvester Jones,

is also present during the celebration.
ity, but was there only as a member.

He was not on official

He testified he would have

arried a night stick onto the premises had he been there on official
uty as one of the Antler Guards.

[R. 4 74].

Pearson admitted he

id not try to identify himself to Mr. Scott, to tackle ,Scott, to
ncapacitate him in any way, or to do any other thing that would
top him from shooting; even though he was only two feet (21) from
im at the time.

[R, 436-437].

The lodge had anticipated some problems might occur during the
lelebration, and had worked out a system to turn the lights on and
•ff if a disturbance occurred.

[R. 517]. However, the system

:ailed miserably, and the lights were off during the shooting rather
;han on; and on and off throughout this period of time with no
ipparent order.

[R. 314, 39 3, 444]. During this time, Scott and

:oleman were repeatedly shooting toward the back bar and shots were
:>eing returned from this area by the man named Blood.

[R. 340-

350, 460-463] .
After David Allen Gray and another man Phillip Dawson were
-12-
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killed, Scott and Coleman continued to shoot as they backed
out of the premises.

[R. 460-462].

After they left, general

chaos broke lose as the patrons scattered to the doors.

The

bandleader who was only a few feet from the front door ob- served many of the patrons going out of the front door and
testified several of them had guns in their belts.

[R. 350].

He identified eight (8) of the people whom he personally knew
who had guns and said there were several others whom he did
not know.

[R. 350].

When the shooting started, the minor decedent, David
Allen Gray, tried to assist his friend Blood to get under
the pinball machine.

[R. 388-389].

He then pushed Brenda

Bradley to the floor and fell upon her, saving her life.
[R. 315].

She said during the approximate one-half (1/2) hour

she had been talking to Gray prior to the shooting, she
didn't observe him with a gun, nor did she see him with a gun
after the shooting started.

[R. 315]. Several of the other

patrons who had seen and talked to David Allen Gray also
testified he did not have a gun on his person the night
he was killed.

ua^

[R. 280-281, 289, 292, 319, 338, 376, 526].

And the officer who searched the person of David Allen Gray
after his death testified he didn't find any weapon of any kind
on the decedent.

[R. 726].

*

-
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POINT I

THE TRIAL JUDGE COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN GIVING
INSTRUCTION NO. 36 BECAUSE THE INSTRUCTION WAS IN EFFECT A
DIRECTED VERDICT IN FAVOR OF THE BEEHIVE LODGE OF ELKS #40 7
AND ITS OFFICERS AND AGAINST THE PLAINTIFF.
Instruction No. 36 reads as follows:

"You are instructed

that a private lodge or association, as well as its officers, has
no duty to anyone to anticipate that a crime will be committed
by another person, and to act upon that belief."

[R. 198]. This

instruction was adopted verbatim by the court from the defendant's
proposed Instruction No. 26.

[R. 141]. The plaintiff objected

to the giving of this instruction because (1) the jury should
have been given the sole discretion to determine whether under the
circumstances of this case, it was reasonable or not reasonable
for the lodge to anticipate and foresee that crimes, to-wit: shootings and/or assaults and batteries would occur during the New Year's
Eve Celebration because of the past history of such events, [R.
952]; and (2) the court did not define what a crime was.
The plaintiff submits the court's Instruction No. 36 is in
effect a directed verdict in favor of Beehive Lodge of Elks and
its officers and against the plaintiff.
U.2d 7, 394 P.2d 879 (1964).

Purrant v. Pelton, 16

The instruction amounted to both a

finding of fact and a review of the evidence by the trial judge;
whereas the jury has the exclusive prerogative to make such findings
of fact and to weigh the evidence.

Flynn v. W. P. Harlin Con-

struction Company, 29 U.2d 327, 509 P.2d 356 (1973)
The plaintiff submits the evidence would justify the followDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

ing findings of fact by the jury:
1. There were several fracases or fights on the premises
of the Beehive Lodge of Elks each year. [R. 48] .
2. Less than three (3) months prior to the New Year's Eve
Celebration there was a shoot out during a gambling argument and
fight; that during this time one of the participants went outside, got his gun, came back in, went downstairs in the basement
where the gambling game was being held and shot the other participant in the leg. All of this was done in the presence of James
E. Dooley, the most exalted ruler of the lodge. [R. 482-486].
3. The gambling shooting was well known to members of the
lodge. [R. 848-849, 891].
4. Shortly after this gambling shooting incident and less
than a month prior to the New Year's Eve Celebration, James Dooley
asked Anderson Pearson, a member of the Antler Guard - the lodge's
internal security division - to go uptown to get more training in
security so that he would be able to better perform his duties
during the New Year's Eve Celebration. [R. 409-410].
5. Anderson Pearson had had no training in how to deal with
shootings or knifings and this is the reason Mr. Dooley sent him
to get the special training. Both Mr. Dooley and Mi;. Pearson agree
that the special training would be necessary to prevent shootings
chr knifings. [R. 411] .
6. Less than forty-eight (4 8) hours prior to the New Year's
Eve Celebration there was a fight inside the Beehive Lodge of Elks
premises involving Galveston Sonny Scott, David Allen Gray, and
Blood or Youngblood - the same three (3) persons involved in the
New Year's Eve shooting. This fight was broken up by Exie Gray
who was the acting manager of the New Year's Eve Celebration and
also the Saturday night dance. [R. 736-746] .
7. When Galveston Sonny Scott left the premises after the
Saturday night fight he had a 35 7 magnum in his hand which everyone saw. [R- 738].
8. When Scott went outside he was confronted with rifle
shots from Gray and Blood and returned the fire for several minutes. [R. 564, 381-583] .
9. Several persons inside the premises heard the shooting
outside within two (2) mintues after Scott left. [R. 786-787].
10. Within a very few minutes after the shooting, several
people ran inside to tell Exie Gray that the shooting had occurred.
[R. 368, 399-401].

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may_1
contain
R -errors.

11. After the Saturday night shoot out many of the members
who left the dance had guns in their belts and these guns were observed out on the street in front of the lodge. [R. 744].
12. The Saturday night dance stopped early because of this
fi^ht. [R. 364-366].
13. Exie Gray told Jim Dooley and Anderson Pearson about
the fight. [R. 400, 424].
14. Both the Saturday night fight and the shooting and the
New Year's Eve shooting involved the same participants, to-wit:
Galveston Sonny Scott, David Allen Gray, and a man by the name of
Blood or Youngblood. [R. 340-350, 460-463; 563-564, 579-583].
15. Nathaniel Johnson, the chairman of tne New Year's Eve
Celebration, said if he had known about the fight he would have
banned both Gray and Scott from the premises. [R. 915].
16.

A fight is a crime, to-wit: assault and/or battery.

17. A shooting without justification is a crime, to-wit:
murder, manslaughter, assault with a deadly weapon, attempted mura
der, etc.
18. James Dooley, Shelly Smith, the bandleader, and other
members of the lodge knew that David Allen Gray and Scott were on
the premises during both the Saturday night fight and the New
Year's Eve Celebration. [R. 280, 311, 337-338, 526].
19. Members of the New Year's Eve committee knew that Galveston Sonny Scott was on the premises during the New Year's Eve
Celebration. [R. 926-930].
20. David Allen Gray had been seen on the premises by James
Dooley and other members during the New Year's Eve Celebration before Scott came in. [R. 280, 311, 337-338, 372-373, 526].
21. Galveston Sonny Scott was known by most of the members
of the Beehive Lodge of Elks. [R. 444, 534-535].
22. James Dooley testified the black community is so small
in Salt Lake City that everyone generally knows everyone else.
[R. 498].
23. David Allen Gray, the minor decedent, had a membership
card on his person at the time of the shooting during the New
Year's Eve Celebration. [R. 726-727. Ex. 25-D,page 1 ] .
The plaintiff submits the foregoing facts which are without
dispute in the evidence, raise the issue of whether the Beehive
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Lodge of Elks and its officers and agents connected with the New
Year's Eve Celebration did in fact have a duty to anticipate that
Galveston Sonny Scott and David Allen Gray and Youngblood would
be on the premises during the New Year's Eve Celebration and/or
whether because of a history of prior fights and/or shootings
on and about the premises,

similar incidents could be expected

during the New Year's Eve Celebration.
The general rule of law is that the duty to use care to
avoid injury to another many be based on imputed or constructive
knowledge - that is, what a prudent person under the circumstances
should have known - since the opportunity for knowledge, when
available by the exercise of reasonable care, is the equivalent
of knowledge itself.

The law of negligence, insofar as perception

is concerned, requires a person to give to his surroundings the
attention that a reasonably prudent person would consider necessary under the circumstances, and he must use his senses to discover what is readily apparent.

One under duty to use care for

which knowledge is necessary cannot escape liability for negligence
because of voluntary ignorance.

57 Am. Jur. 2d, Negligence 406-

407, §56 "Imputed Knowledge."
The courts have uniformly held that the duty of care includes
the duty to anticipate danger that is reasonably foreseeable.
Every person is under duty to exercise his sense of intelligence
in his actions in order to avoid injury to others, and where a
situation

suggests investigation and inspection in order that

its dangers may fully appear, the duty to make such investigation
and inspection is imposed by law.

If the circumstances are such
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lat a person of ordinary common sense who thought about it would
icognize once that if he did not use ordinary care and skill in
Ls own conduct in regard to those circumstances, his acts would
Lace another person in danger, the duty to use ordinary care and
cill to avoid such danger rises.

57 Am. Jur. 2d Negligence 407

57 "Duty to Foresee Danger."
If Exie Gray had made even a cursory investigation of events
arrounding the shooting at the Saturday night dance, he would have
asily determined that Gray, Scott and Blood were involved in the
hooting; or if he could not ascertain their names, would have been
ble to determine the shooting occurred by some of the same partiipants who were on the club premises a few minutes earlier.

In

aking precautionary steps to guard against a recurrence of these
vents during the New Year's Eve Celebration, Exie Gray did not
eed to anticipate the precise injury which was sustained.

In this

egard the general rule of law is that it is not a necessary eletent of negligence that one charged therewith should have been
ble to anticipate the precise injuries sustained.

Nor is it

Lecessary that the injury to the plaintiff himself be foreseeable;
.t is sufficient that the act in question may in human probability
>roduct harm to persons similarly situated.

For anyone liable for

legligence, it is sufficient that he should have foreseen that
tegligence would probably result in injury to some person of some
:ind, but he need not have foreseen the particular consequences or
.njuries that resulted.

In any case, it is the tendency of the

ict involved to cause some injury to the person who is actually
mjured thereby, or to someone else who occupies a position which,
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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in reference to the - u c , is titt^I&^Qus to t h e

situiticSW o f

iJjc i n -

jured person, under :-Ivr circinuHl inces known t o the a c t o r ,

tha* i s

to be discovered.

It

AM, JUT; *<;i ^ e g l i g e n e e , pp. 411-41.2 §SS

"Anticipation of Sor« ^ ti^ra I s :V?i:i ,tcient. "
••.V''

The New Year's-* >:;-«*
'> ^ e k n

!

:

; ,>n was s u c h an event o r

social

function that would • t-* . *wt .aVi iS, •• members of the black
and i t seems c l e a r t . , •; • :• f i g h t and shooting s.

;>ho

coimnnity,

knew about the Saturday night

u havr« : :". . .n f u r t h e r

steps to e n s u r e t h a t

Scott and Gray and BU,o-i ^ o u l i >^fc be t o g e t h e r on the premises;
a t the same time dux?:.-? :.:o N»»-. •'••ir's Eve Celebration.
r

Nathaniel C. 0 ,.

, '.,, tK, ,;in :;man of

.

the New Y e a r ' s Eve

Celebration, t e s t i f i '.-•* .. i" he !;.•>/• i-uown about the fight between
Scott and Gray on th

_ . - .fo^s .,(

, g the Saturday night dance, he

would have banned bo'h e?u: fr^ia i-iy-: premies.
shows he would have '

[R. 915].

This

* * ' a ^ . j < w ;her t r o u b l e and the j u r y could

e a s i l y have found un .\?y ':h-3 <. ».* .. ,.[.. cances, t h i s i s what James.Dooley, Exie Gray, a.;i/' .- VcT* -

Pearson should have done a f t e r

the Saturday night fi *;i!

a n t i c i p a t e t h a t perhaps anof-hOT

f i g h t and/or shooting
to take s u f f i c i e n t

!.'>

- i^ i b. .:. > ><.tted by the same p a r t i e s arid

a< I ,

o ;

'

t did not happen by t a l k i n g

to the p a r t i e s invoT

l !c , .• i ,

premises.

,if*itlv r v! rie Gray, James Dooley or

Unfortunately,

them to stay away from the club

Anderson Pearson were -::s ..'nc. '< • < . bout the fighting and shoottljg
as Nathaniel Johnson said Ue ^ould have been.
The case of Tnc'i

'

479 3.W.2d 84.2 (1972)

:'.

' 1 I'•.-. ;.
ry

• :h

, -

usinesr-inen' s Club, I n c . v. jBjgis,
n point.

This was a s u i t lby an

i n v i t e e against a p r i 'at,:: <"lub uio e t h e r s for compensatory and.
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and punitive damages because of injuries attributable to a gunshot
wound.

The" plaintiff was wounded while he was on the premises of

a nonprofit corporation known as Industrial Businessmen's Club.
He arrived shortly after midnight and stayed there until approximately 6:30 a.m.

Beer and other intoxicating beverages were served

on the premises and there was no evidence that anyone was turned
away from the club.

Several other people on the premises had guns

and were gambling.
Insofar as the duty of a private club to anticipate that
crimes will be committed on the premises is concerned, the Arkansas
Supreme Court, commencing on pp. 848 of the S.W.2d reports steted
in part as follows:
"We have^said that no distinction exists between
hotels^ and glacis of public amusement ;jU> the
)• .i,:u
" matter of precaution to be taken for persons
. : .invited tQ ,ejijoy facilities f urnishe-d- > +\ -v We
'*
recognize that neither are insurers of the safety
,
,
sr
t ? Q £ ,theiy-guests, but that both are charged with
the duty of taking all precautions for the pro. .
tectiofl of^tfreir guests which reasonable prudence and ordinary care would suggest ". . . the
,tweight of^authority supports the view that while ri
a tavern keeper or bar operator is not "an ih. purer ofa.the. .safety of his patrons, he is under ~"t:he duty to use reasonable care and vigilence
.to protect guests or patrons from reasonably
5
*foreseeable injury, mistreatment, or annoyance
. — • a^< thefraudsof other patrons. . .
,..,.. ,^ r
_^ r"N,egligence in such a situation may consist, of , . ;-»-^,-,-f-.
~"failure to take appropriate action to eject
* ""J••"'"/'""
.s-;\m
persons of undesirable character fjpm the pre- H - ;,
mises or knowingly permitting irresponsible,
/ vicious or drunken persons to be on, or about, the ,,5; v\
^premises, or failure to maintain order and
" *'*'
sobriety in the establishment. Of course, the
proprieter is not required to protect patrons
of a bar or tavern from unlikely dangers of
^ or
improbable harm, but he is required to take'
affirmative action to maintain order when h^rm
—
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to patrons is reasonably foreseeable, and
certainly whenever the circumstances are such
as to indicate that the danger of harm to
patrons by other patrons should have been anticipated by one reasonably alert . . . in this
respect, the court's instruction as to the
liability of Buck in the club was correct,"
[Emphasis Added].
Similarly, in the instant case, the court's Instruction No.
36 should have been replaced by an instruction similar to the gener
principles of law set forth in the Industrial Park Businessmen's
Club, Inc. case.
Beehive Lodge

L

The court should have instructed the jury the
in

_

"was under the duty to use reasonable care and
vigilence to protect guests or patrons from
reasonably foreseeable injury, mistreatment
or annoyance including crimes, at the hand of
other patrons; and where harm to patrons is
reasonably foreseeable and certainly where the
circumstances are such as to indicate that the
danger of harm to patrons by other patrons should
have been anticipated by one reasonably alert."
Such an instruction was requested by the plaintiff, but refused by
the court.

[Plaintiff's Requested Instruction NO. 26 (R. 111)].

Insofar as the defendants argument that they had no duty to
anticipate crimes would be committed because no such incidenis had
occurred previously, see the case of Samson v. Saginaw
sional Building, Inc.,

Profes-

393 Mich. 393, 224 N.W.2d 843 (1975).

In discussing the issue of "no prior incidents of a similar
nature on the premises," the Michigan Supreme Court stated on pp.
849 of the N.W. 29 Reports, as follows:
"The fact that no prior events had taken place
in the Saginaw Professional Building and that
the director had not been involved in incidents
of this nature in nine (9) years, plus the fact
that the State of Michigan had released these
patients into the community all go to the question of whether or not an unreasonable risk of
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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harm was present under the circumstances. No
prior incidents would possibly indicate a very
low probability of an event occurring in the
future. A low probability, however, must be
balanced against the magnitude of the potential
harm involved to determine whether or not
inaction under these circumstances is reasonable.
Also, reasonableness, as foreseeability, £¥
normally a question for the jury to determine.
General tort principles require this approach.
If the risk involves possible death or serious
bodily injury to a number of persons, the law
requires that some care be exercised, even
though the probability is slight that the"incident will occur. Whether the care exercised
is reasonable under the circumstances is for
the jury to determine.
"The existence of a relationship between the
defendant and its tenants and invitees placed
a duty upon the landlord to protect them
from unreasonable risk of physical harm. The
fact that such an event might occur in the future
was foreseeable with this defendant. It had
even been brought to its attention by other
tenants in the building. The magnitude of
the risk, that a criminally insane person
running amok within an office building filled
with tenants and invitees, was substantial to
say the least. To hold that, possessed of these
facts and no other, this defendant should have
inquired further into the reasonableness of
its inaction, i.e. the probability of such an
event occurring in the future, and that its
failure to make such an inquiry may be deemed
neglgience on its part, does not shock the
conscience of this courtT" [Emphasis Added].
Similarly in the instant case when the management of the
Beehive Lodge of Elks knew about the prior fighting between Scott
and Gray and they knew, or should have known, that the shooting
on the outside of the premises involved Blood, Gray, and Scott
and when there was a history of fights at the lodge and at least
one prior shooting during a gambling fight, there was a duty both
to investigate that shooting and to take adequate precautions to
prevent such fightings and/or shootings occurring in the future
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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especially when all of the black community were likely to attend
the New Year's Eve Celebration.

In Samson, the court concluded

its opinion by holding that the jury should determine the ultimate
questions quich may impose liability, those of foreseeability,
reasonableness, and proximate cause. In the instant case, however,
the trial judge did not allow the jury to determine these issues.
In the case of Durrant v. Pelton, 16 U.2d 7, 394 P.2d 879
(1964), the Utah Supreme Court held that a trial judge committed
prejudicial error and in effect directed a verdict when he gave
an instruction that a driver had the duty to keep her vehicle
always under control so as to avoid an accident.

This court said

in part on p. 8 of the U.2d Reports, as follows:
"For our purposes it is sufficient to say that
even considering the testimony in the light
most favorable to the plaintiff, who was the
prevailing party below, the trial court erred
in not 'permitting the jury to determine, in
the light of existing conditions, what a reasonable and prudent person would do under the
circumstances.'" [Emphasis Added].
The court further stated in part on p. 10 of the U.2d Reports as
follows:
"However, the test 'as to what constitutes a
particular lookout is usually *** - a latterday classic question for jury determination,
and each trial and appellate court may determine the question as a matter of law only when
convinced that reasonable persons could not
disagree upon the question in conscientiously
applying fact to law.' . . . A jury should
determine what a reasonable and prudent person
would do under the conditions as they existed
at the time of the accident."
[Emphasis Added].
Similarly in the instant case, the plaintiff submits the trial judge
should have allowed the jury to determine whether under all of the
circumstances the Beehive Lodge of Elks should have anticipated
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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that "crimes" such as fights, shootings, knifings, etc., would
have been committed on the premises during the New Year's Eve
Celebration.
The plaintiff submits the duty of the Beehive Lodge of Elks
and its officers insofar as business invitees and other patrons
on the premises is concerned, is analogous to a landlord's duties
to its tenants insofar as protecting the tenants from criminal
activities of third persons. An exhaustive discussion of this
matter is set forth in 42 A.L.R.3rd 311 (1970), "Landlord's
Obligation to Protect Tenant Against Criminal Activities of Third
Persons."

The cases collected in this annotation hold that a land-

lord is under an affirmative duty to protect his tenants and
invitees from a foreseeable unreasonable risk of criminal attack
from third persons.

See particularly the cases of Johnston v. Harris,

387 Mich. 569, 198 N.W.2d 409 (1972); Kline v. 1500 Massachussetts
Avenue Apartment Corp., 439 F.2d 477 (D.C.Cir. 1970); and Kendall
v. Gore Properties,

236 F.2d 673 (D.C.Cir. 1956).

In the Kendall

case, the court underscored the analogy between the liability of
a landlord for exposing his tenants to physical defects in the premises and his liability for exposing his tenants to an unreasonable
risk of criminal attack.
To the same effect see 2 Harper & James Torts (1956) §16.9
p. 931, wherein the author states:

^

"The amount of caution required tendd. to increase
with the seriousness of the injury if it happens.
If the harm which may be foreseen is great, conduct which threatens it may be negligent even
though the statistical probability of its happening is very slight indeed." [Emphasis Added].
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Similarly a ten percent (10%) risk of death, murderous assault,
blindness or other great bodily harm may be condemned by the jury
as an unreasonable risk, especially where the burden of adequate
precautions is relatively slight as it is in the instant case where
five (5) security guards could have been hired for a six (6) hour
sift at a cost of only Eighty-Three Dollars and Seventy Cents
($83.70) [R. 627-628] and where chemical mace capable of rendering Scott, Gray and Blood unconscious for thirty (30) minutes could
have been obtained for a cost of only Seven Dollars and NinetyFive Cents ($7.95).

[R. 618].

The plaintiff submits this prior history of fights, shootingsi
etc., distinguish the instant case from all those other cases cited
by defendants where the private clubs and its officers had absolutely no prior notice of any kind of any trouble between the
offending participants or had no knowledge of any circumstances
that would give rise to a duty on their part or on the part of the
club to anticipate problems between the participants.
Instruction No. 36 was urged on the court by defendant's
counsel on the basis of the Utah case

of Strong v. Granite Furni-

ture Co., 77 U. 292, 294 P. 303 (1930).

[R. 698-700].

The Strong

case involved a claim for damages for household furniture and
other items which were stolen from plaintiff's home.
had purchased some household goods from defendants.

The plaintiff
When the

plaintiff became delinquent in paying for the goods, the defendants
entered plaintiff's home during her absence and removed their
merchandise.

Sometime thereafter, other unknown persons broke into

plaintiff's home and stole other items of personal property.
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Plain-

tiff sued defendants for leaving the windows in her home in such
an unfastened state the burglars were later able to gain easy
access to the home.

The issue presented was one of proximate cause:

was the burglary a natural and probable consequence of the defendant's negligence - assuming they were negligent - an issue the
court did not ever have to decide.
The Supreme Court held the defendant's negligence was too
remote to constitute the proximate cause, when an independent,
illegal, criminal act of a third person, which could not reasonably have been foreseen, and without which such injury would not
have been sustained intervenes. Based upon this fact situation,
the court said a person is not bound to anticipate malicious or
criminal acts of others by which damage is inflicted.

This is

the part of the opinion the trial judge in the instant case used
to instruct the jury.
However, it appears obvious the instant case is factually
different from Strong.

In the instant case, there were a con-

siderable amount of prior shootings, knifings, fightings, etc.,
on the premises sufficient to justify an inference by the jury
that the defendants knew or should have known that other fightings
and shootings should be reasonably anticipated on the premises
during the New Year's Eve Celebration, and have taken sufficient
steps to prevent these "crimes."
Had the trial judge read further in the Strong case, he
would have found modifying language that should have been used
in his Instruction No. 36 and which the plaintiff requested in
his Instruction No. 26 [R. Ill] but which was refused.
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This

language is cited by the Utah Supreme Court on p. 302 of the Utah
Reports as follows:
"But where an independent illegal act is of a
nature which might have been anticipated, and
which it was the defendant's duty to provide
against, he will be liable for breach of such
duty notwithstanding the production of injuries
by the intervention of an act of the character
described."
The language just cited is in accordance with the case of Industrie
Park Businessmen's Club, Inc. v. Buck, supra, and the other cases
cited in support of the general rules of law described in Buck.
This language would have permitted the jury to decide the ultimate
issue in this case instead of taking the case from them.

2 Restate

ment Law of Torts 2d, §449 "Tortious or Criminal Acts, Probability
of Which Makes Actor's Conduct Negligent;" §302B "Risk of Intentional or Criminal Conduct," Subsection (e) p. 90; 57 Am. Jur.2d
Negligence 583-586 §207 "Foreseeable Criminal Conduct," and §208
"Concurrent Operation of Negligence and Intervening Criminal Act." .
Terrell v. Key System, 69 Cal. App. 2d 682, 159 P.2d 704 (1945)
which was an action to recover for injuries a passenger sustained
during a fall from a train owned by the defendant Railroad Company.
The passenger fell when struck or pushed by another passenger, during a brawl participated in by other passengers following a "crap"
game. The evidence showed previous experience of disorders arising
from "crap" games; and the prior experience prevented the carrier
from escaping liability on the theory that its negligence, if any,
would not be the proximate cause of the injuries because they were
the result of an intervening criminal act of a third party.
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See

also Wallace v. Per - Ohanin, 199 Cal. App. 2d 144, 18 Cal.
Rptr 892 (1962), where a camp operator was held to be liable
for injuries and damages sustained by a girl from an unknown
assailant when she was a camp visitor and where the court found
the risk for sexual moestation should have been foreseen and
guarded against by the operator; even though there had been no
prior incidents of a similar nature occurring at the camp.
In the instant case, plaintiff's counsel submitted to
the court proposed instructions dealing with the general principles of law set forth in Strong and Buck, but the trial judge
refused these instructions.

[R. 111]. By instructing the jury

in accordance with Instruction No. 36, the jury was given
only part of the general rule of law without the corresponding
counterpart providing that if the crime is of a nature which
might have been anticipated, and which it was the defendant's
duty to provide against, the defendant would be liable for
a breach of the duty notwithstanding the production of injuries
by the intervention of an act of the character described.
This other part was necessary to allow the jury to be the
sole judges of the credibility of the evidence and to be
the sole triers of fact. By taking the issues from the jury,
the court in effect directed a verdict in favor of the
defendant lodge and its officers against the plaintiff. Durrant v. Pelton, supra.
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POINT II

THE TRIAL JUDGE COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN REFUSING TO
ADMIT THE TESTIMONY OF PLAINTIFF'S EXPERT WITNESS WILLIAM GATELY
SINCE HIS TESTIMONY WAS RELATED TO THE ISSUE OF REASONABLE
SECURITY MEASURES WHICH WERE NOT TAKEN BY THE DEFENDANT BEEHIVE
LODGE OF ELKS #407; AND BECAUSE THE TRIAL JUDGE DID ADMIT TESTIMONY SOLICITED BY DEFENDANTS FROM OTHER WITNESSES BEARING UPON THIS
ISSUE.
The trial judge instructed the jury on the issues of ordinary care [Instruction No. 10 (R. 169)] and negligence [Instruction
No. 15 (R. 176)] but then refused plaintiff the opportunity to produce a witness who would have been most helpful to the jury in
determining these two issues.

In his instructions, the court statec

the standard of conduct required in any given case "is dictated and
measured by the immediate requirements of the occasion as determinec
by existing facts and circumstances."

[R. 176]. This was further

emphasized to be "the exercise of reasonable diligence and such
watchfulness, caution and foresight as under all of the circumstances of a particular case would be exercised by a reasonably,
careful, prudent person."

[R. 169]. i

,

In the instant case, the plaintiff alleges the defendants
breached their duty of reasonable care, diligence, watchfulness,
caution, and foresight in several regards, to-wit:
1. When Anderson Pearson refused to get the special security
training which Mr. James Dooley, the most exalted ruler of the
Beehive Lodge of Elks, requested him to obtain less than one (1)
month prior to the New Year's Eve Celebration and for the specific
purpose of better performing his security duties at the said
Celebration, in being able to handle shootings, knifings, etc.
[R. 407-412].
2. When Exie Gray failed to investigate the Saturday night
shooting to determine who did the shooting, etc.
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3. When the Beehive Lodge of Elks failed to take proper/
necessary, and reasonable steps to insure that a recurrence of the
Saturday night fight between Galveston Sonny Scott and the decedent David Allen Gray did not happen during the New Year's Eve
Celebration. In this regard, the lodge's officer Exie Gray was
the acting manager of both the Saturday night dance and the New
Year's Eve Celebration. [B. 383, 504-505]. He reported the fact
of the Saturday night fight to James Dooley; [R. 400] and Anderson
Pearson [R. 424]; yet none of these three did anything.
4. By not having an adequate detection system set up at the
front entryway to detect persons who came into the lodge carrying
guns. It is clear the defendant Galveston Sonny Scott had a gun;
and Shelly 0. Smith, the bandleader, said after the shooting, he
observed many people moving toward the front door with guns in
their belts. He mentioned eight (8) of these persons by name and
said there were several others whose names he did not know. [R. 350].
5. By not exercising due diligence to become aware of the
fight that took place when several of Mr. Scott's friends grabbed
him and wrestled him to the ground for several minutes after he
entered the premises. This occurred several minutes prior to the
shooting. [R. 569-570]. Had the management exercised due diligence
in this matter, they would have been able to determine, as Mr.
Scott's friends did, that Scott had a gun and could have taken him
outside at that point.
6. By not having Anderson Pearson identify himself and
disarm Galveston Sonny Scott and take him outside when Pearson was
two feet (2') from him and he noticed Mr. Scott had a gun in his
hand which had not yet been used. [R. 436-438].
7. By not having James Dooley identify himself and disarm
Scott and send him outside when Dooley was only three feet (3') away
from Scott and he noticed Scott had a gun in his hand behind his
back which had not been used yet, and he watched Scott move toward
the rear of the building and put a chair on top of a table and
commence firing. [R. 445].
8. By not having sufficient security personnel on the premises during a New Year's Eve Celebration where a large amount of
money was present at the entryway, where intoxicating beverages
were served, and where other shootings and fights had occurred within
a reasonable period of time so as to put the Beehive Lodge of Elks
under the duty to take sufficient steps to insure the said fightings
and/or shootings did not recur.
9. In not having adequate security equipment on the person
of Anderson Pearson and available for use by him during the New
Year's Eve Celebration; such equipment consisting of a Kel-light
2 1/2 pound flashlight, chemical mace which could have rendered
Scott unconscious, and other measures.
10.

In not insuring that Anderson Pearson and/or other members
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of the lodge's officers had sufficient unarmed combat training so
as to be able to disable Mr. Scott by a blow to the shoulder
when Anderson Pearson and James Dooley were only a few feet from
him and before he had started shooting.
The plaintiff alleges all of the foregoing statement of
facts did bear on the issue of whether the defendants exercised
reasonable care under the circumstances as they existed during the
New Year's Eve Celebration.

Since the lodge elected to use

Anderson Pearson, an unpaid volunteer, rather than hired security
personnel, it was incumbent upon the lodge to insure the security
was adequate, even though the services were to be rendered gratuitously.

57 Am. Jur. 2d Negligence, 424 §74 "Performance of Duty

Voluntarily or Gratuitously Assumed." 2 Restatement Law of Torts
2d, §323 "Negligent Performance of Undertaking to Pender Services,"
and §324A "Liability to Third Person for Negligent Performance of
Undertaking."

In order for the jury to exercise any reasonable

judgment on this matter, it would have been helpful for them to
know what security equipment was available in the Salt Lake County
Community, what the cost of the security personnel and/or equipment was, and then determine whether the lodge was reasonable in
using or not using any of that security personnel and/or equipment.
The need for testimony on these issues becomes even more
clear when the defendants were permitted to solicit testimony from
another member of the Antlered Guard [the lodge's internal security
division] Sylvester Jones, who was on the premises that evening as
a guest - not in his official capacity.

Mr. Jones said there was

nothing he could have done to disarm Scott and/or Binky Coleman
when he saw them moving toward the rear of the building.
474].

[R. 473-

He did admit however that had he been on duty, he would
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have carried a night stick onto the premises.

[R. 474]. The

plaintiff should have been permitted to show what could have been
done to stop the shooting, if Mr. Pearson had obtained certain
security equipment readily available in Salt Lake County and/or if
he had received the security training James Dooley sent him to get.
It was in an effort to rebut the conclusions of Sylvester
Jones stated above and in order to assist the jury to make an
enlightened judgment upon the issue of negligence and ordinary care,
that the plaintiff called as an expert witness one William Gately.
[R. 611-639. Abstract pp. 27-35].

The defendants objected to any

testimony from Mr. Gately; so the plaintiff made an offer of
proof pursuant to Rule 43(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
The offer of proof was specifically made in two (2) separate parts,
to-wit:

the first part dealing with what security personnel and

equipment are available in the Salt Lake County and Salt Lake City
community; and the second part dealing with a "security survey"
which Mr. Gately had made.

[R. 637]. It was specifically pointed

out to the court the first part of the offer of proof did not go to
Mr. Gately's expert opinion as to his security survey; but was
testimony based on Mr. Gately's personal knowledge, observation and
experience in the Salt Lake County community to the effect that
certain security people are available, what training they have, and
what equipment is available, such as chemical mace, night sticks,
etc.

[R. 637]. The court refused the offer of proof on either of

these separate grounds; and further refused to accept Exhibit 14-P
which was Mr. Gately's security survey consisting of his findings
and conclusions on these two (2) separate parts of his testimony.
[R. 637-638].
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Mr. Gately stated he was the division manager for Wallace
Detective and Security Agency and had been so employed since 1965.
[R. 612]. He stated he was responsible for twelve (12) states and
approximately six hundred (600) people working for this security
agency.

[R. 612]. He testified he had worked as a securivy office

for private clubs checking I.D.'s, crowd control on the pre: ses
and around the premises to keep fights and other problems av;:y.
[R. 613] . He testified he had been engaged as a private clut manager for three (3) years in Portland, Oregon in a restaurant lounge
that had live entertainment seven (7) nights a week.

[R. 613]. He

testified he was familiar with the security personnel and equipment that are available in Salt Lake County.

[R. 613]. In responsi

to a question by the court, he stated there were private clubs in
Salt Lake City that do avail themselves of the type of services his
company provides.

[R. 614]. He stated he provides fifty (50)

security people for work in Salt Lake County.

[R. 615].

Mr. Gately testified he was familiar with the type of equipment available in the Salt Lake Community for use by security
personnel and that it was used by Wallace Security.

He identified

the security equipment the guards would carry with them while they
are performing security services as chemical mace and also a Kellight which is an eighteen inch (18") combination flashlight and nigh
stick weighing approximately two and one-half pounds (2 1/2 lbs).
[R. 616-617].

He said the chemical mace of the type normally used

is CD-2. He said it comes in two (2) forms - either a cloud or a
direct stream deflect of up to and including ten (10) feet.

It

works on the nerve and respiratory systems of the person shot with
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it.

He says it is aimed and sprayed in the high chest or face area.

It will completely disable a person for a period of approximately
twenty-five to thirty (25-30) minutes by knoddng him out - rendering
him unconscious.

[R. 617]. He said there is no danger that the

person sprayed would suffer some bodily injury or death by the
mace because its effects wear off in twenty-five to thirty (25-30)
minutes.

[R. 617]. He said the chemical mace cost Seven Dollars

and Ninety-Five Cents ($7.95) for a tube which would provide twenty
to thirty (20-30) shots. He said the spray is used like an aerosol
under arm deoderant spray.

[R. 618]. He stated that security

people would be trained in where to aim the spray, when to use it,
and how to use it so that they don't render themselves ineffective
at the same time.
Mr. Gately testified trained security personnel would be
trained in crowd control including unarmed combat as well as security
awareness to recognize potential problems, etc.
had been a head instructor on this training.

He testified he

He testified his

security personnel receive training in disabling a person who like
Scott might have a firearm in their hgnd or another dangerous weapon
and was threatening somebody else with it.
Mr. Gately testified the presence of men in uniform is a
deterrent to anyone who is going to try to commit a crime and this
would have stopped Scott at the entryway.

[R. 633]. He said that

if Mr. Scott had gotten through the entryway without being detected,
he would have been removed from the premises as soon as the fracas
started with his friends, because the other security officers
would have converged on the area and immediately disbursed the
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,

people.

[R. 633] .

He testified if one of his security officers had been
standing behind Mr. Scott such as Anderson Pearson was doing, he
could have disarmed him by using self-defense, anti-combat type
thing.

He testified one judo blow to the shoulder of the gun hand

would have disabled the entire arm.

[R. 633]. He said chemical

mace could have been used up to ten feet (10') away.

When the coui

asked him if this could be done even with other people in the immediate area he said "Yes, your Honor.
with a gun standing there.
than shot."

I mean you've got a man

Those people would rather be maced

To which the court agreed.

[R. 634]. He stated if

Scott had been coming off the dance floor and raising his gun to
start to shoot, a security officer could have used his club-like
flashlight to disable the arm and could have used the chemical mace
from ten feet (101) away.

He said it was definitely wrong for a

security officer to run away and get down under the table because
security people are trained to react on instinct to situations like
that.

He stated emphatically that with reasonable security measure

in effect, the shooting never would have occurred.

[R. 636] .

Mr. Gately then testified about a security survey he had
made for the Beehive Lodge of Elks premises to determine "what
security measures would be reasonable for this location."

[R. 620]

He stated he had been present in court during the first three (3)
days of testimony, that he reviewed the criminal trial transcript
of Galveston Sonny Scott, the answers to interrogatories filed by
the Beehive Lodge of Elks in the above entitled matter [R. 629];
that he went to the Salt Lake City Police Department to get the
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
nc

nnual report dealing with crime densities in Salt Lake City.
R. 621-622]; and that he used certain manuals and other publica:ions in the industry which outline basic procedures and different
:ypes and needs in the field of security.

[R. 621-622]. *

Based on these factors together with approximately forty (40)
security surveys he had made for private clubs similar to the
3eehive Lodge of Elks.

[R. 623], he determined in his opinion

bhere was no security or any security measures in effect at the
Beehive Lodge of Elks premises to protect patrons and guests that
night be on the premises during the New Year's Eve Celebration.
[R. 629]. His findings, and conclusions were set forth in his
security survey which was marked as Exhibit 14-P; which the court
refused to admit.

[R. 630,638].

The plaintiff submits Mr. Gately's opinion testimony dealing
with the security survey would have been helpful to the jury in
determining the issue of negligence and ordinary care and it was
not inadmissible because it related to the ultimate
issue to be decided by the jury.

fact in

Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 56.

Based on the security survey, Mr. Gately stated in his opinion adequate security would call for five (5) security officers
consisting of four (4) officers and one (1) post supervisor.
He testified where these men would be stationed.

[R. 626].

[R. 626-627].

He testified the cost of these five (5) security people for a six
(6) hour period from 9:00 p.m. on New Year's Eve until 3:00"a.m. on
New Year's morning would total Eighty-Three Dollars and Seventy
Center ($83.70) which would be Two Dollars and Seventy Cents ($2.70)
per hour for the four (4) guard officers and Three Dollars and
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Fifteen Cents ($3.15) per hour for the post supervisor.

[R. 627-

628] . •

The plaintiff submits this testimony from Mr. Gately was
competent and would have been very helpful to the jury in determining such security oriented questions as (1) should Mr. Pearson hav<
been wearing some type of security uniform; (2) should Mr. Pearson
have had a Kel-light flashlight, chemical mace, or other equipment
which could have been used to completely disable Mr. Galveston
Sonny Scott and render him unconscious; (3) did Mr. Pearson have
adequate unarmed combat type training to allow him to totally disal
Scott's right arm which would have permitted him from being able
to use his gun, and was Pearson negligent for notJgetting this
training when Dooley asked him to less than one (1) month prior to
the Celebration; (4) whether Anderson Pearson and/or Jim Dooley wei
sufficiently trained in crowd control, unarmed combat, and use of
security oriented equipment to have prevented the shooting which
killed the minor decedent David Allen Gray; (5) should the men at
the front entryway have stopped Scott when he entered the premises;
(6) should Pearson, Dooley and the other officer have detected the
fight between Scott and his friends after Scott entered the premise
and should they have taken Scott outside.
Since the jury was not experienced in security matters and
since a lay person would not know about available training in unarm
combat, use of Kel-light flashlights, chemical mace and other equip
ment available, nor about costs for security personnel and equipmen
Mr. Gately's testimony would have been admissible to assist the
jury on these issues.

Stagmeyer v. Leatham Brothers, Inc., 20 U.2d
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431, 439 P.2d 279 (1968).
The plaintiff submits all of this testimony would be relevant
to the issue of whether the Beehive Lodge of Elks acted with
ordinary care or were negligent in providing security measures for
the New Year's Eve Celebration.

By refusing to allow the testimony,

the plaintiff submits the trial judge committed prejudicial error,
and deprived plaintiff of his right to a jury trial by withholding
from the jury competent evidence relevant to the issues raised by
the plaintiff.

POINT III

THE TRIAL JUDGE COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN ADMITTING THE
TESTIMONY OF DEFENDANTS' WITNESS SALT LAKE POLICE OFFICER JAMES
BURNS BECAUSE HIS TESTIMONY WAS NOT INTRODUCED BY DEFENDANTS FOR ANY
RELEVANT OR LEGITIMATE PURPOSE, BECAUSE HE WAS NOT COMPETENT TO
TESTIFY AND BECAUSE THE COURT HAD REFUSED TO ADMIT THE TESTIMONY
OF PLAINTIFF'S WITNESS WILLIAM GATELY BEARING ON THE SAME ISSUES
THAT DETECTIVE BURNS TEST IFIED TO.
The defendant Beehive Lodge of Elks called as its last witness
James Burns, a police officer for the Salt Lake City Corporation
working as a detective in the vice squad.
47-48].

[R. 934-941. Abstract pp.

After refusing to permit William Gately to testify and

over numerous objections from plaintiff's counsel, the court allowed
Mr. Burns to testify that he was not "aware of a private club having
a security agency provided for security."

The court allowed this

testimony even though Mr. Burns admitted on voir dire examination
he had not had any occasion to check with private clubs personally,
nor to ask the management in the clubs what security measures they
had taken for various security functions.

[R. 936]. He further
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admitted he had not made any studies of a particular club to determine if they had security or not.

[R. 936-937].

However, evei

with this lack of foundation, the court permitted him to testify.
.# _ , Mr. Burns was not presented as an expert witness [R. 937-93J
and the court refused to admit his testimony for the purpose of
showing custom or practice.

[R. 938]. However, he was allowed tc

answer the following question:

"Would you tell us, officer, what

you have observed from your own experience in regard to these pri\;
clubs and lodges?"

Mr. Burns then stated:

"I have never been awa

of a private club having a security agency provided for security
at a private club."
It is clear Mr. Burns' answer was in the first place not
responsive to the question asked.

He was asked what he had observ

in regard to private clubs and lodges.

His answer said that he wa

not aware of a private club having any security agency provided.
This answer was a conclusion and went far beyond his competency.
To be responsive, his answer should have merely stated what he observed - whether in fact he saw any security people in uniforms,
carrying security equipment, etc.
Furthermore, it is obvious there is no foundation as to whet
he knew anything about security agencies.

He admitted in voir dir

examination that he had never checked with the private clubs perso
ally to ask the management in each club as to what security measun
they had taken for security functions.

[R. 936]. He did not say

he had checked with any security agencies to see if personnel had
been furnished to private clubs. Without this foundation, his ansi
would be inadmissible.
Even
Mr.LawBurns'
testimony
was
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and usage and a proper foundation had been shown, the plaintiff
still submits the testimony was prejudicial and should not have
been allowed because the court had refused to allow plaintiff's
witness, William Gately to testify about security personnel, equipment, etc.; although Mr. Gately testified there were private clubs in
Salt Lake City that used security personnel from Wallace Security.
[R. 614]. It is generally held that if the introduction in a negligence situation of evidence as to precautions taken by others to
avoid the infliction of injury under the same or similar conditions
would result in a confusion of issues or inject many new controversial points collateral to the issues, or if it would tend to generate
surprise and undue prejudice disproportionate to the usefulness of
the evidence it should not be admitted.

Brigham Young University v.

Lillywhite, 118 F.2d 336 (1941) and 137 ALR 611 "Admissibility,
Upon Issue of Negligence, of Evidence of Custom or Practice of Others."
In Lillywhite, the trial court used a cautionary instruction
to the jury which was not done by the court in the instant case.
The plaintiff submits Mr. Burns' testimony led to a confusion of the
issues and also to an introduction of new controversial parts collateral to the main issue.

Since Mr. Gately had been denied the

opportunity to testify, there was no evidence presented by the plaintiff bearing on security agencies or their use by private clubs.
Any such evidence would therefore be collateral to the main issues
and was prejudicial.
Counsel for the plaintiff raised at least six (6) specific
objections to Mr. Burns' testimony from the time the first question
was asked:

[R. 935-938].
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1. "Your Honor, we will object to this type of
questioning on the same grounds that we were not allowed
to ask Mr. Gately these questions." [R. 935].
2. "Your Honor, I will object to this question.
I would like to voir dire this witness as to his
background." [R. 936].
;v ,

3. "I think he said he has not made any study
as to whether security people were there or not." Lack of Foundation Objection. [R. 937].
4. "Your Honor, we will object to his testimony.
It is totally irrelevant and it is prejudicial,
because the jury has to decide the security here."
[R. 937].
5. "Your Honor, we will object on the other
ground that it is not related to this New Year's Eve
function or the Beehive Lodge of Elks, and that is
the only question here. What has been done in other ,
cases and other occasions is not admissible. It is
not relevant. I mean if this is opened up, I think
I have the opportunity to get into this whole area
we talked about yesterday." - Meaning the testimony
of Mr. William Gately that the court refused to admit
the previous day. [R. 937].

;

6. "Your Honor, we think that invades the
providence of the jury. That is really their question
in this case." [R. 938].
After all of these objections were overruled, and the court
allowed the testimony, counsel for the plaintiff attempted to
rehabilitate the affect of Mr. Burns' testimony, and to determine
what background he had in security, or how he knew whether security
agencies were used by the private clubs.
the following questions:

-

.

Plaintiff's counsel asked
^,

;;

"Q

You are not a security expert, are you?

A

I am not a security guard.

Q

Have you ever been a security guard?

A'

Yes, I have. '^

Q

Have you ever taken any courses in security? *;-?'

No, sir.
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«

A

I don't know what you mean by courses, at the University?

Q

Have you had any special training in security?

--;.•;;.. A
Q

Yes, sir, almost everything I had deals with security.
Alright.

Are you aware of the type of equipment the

people carry when they are performing security functions?
MR. RUSSON:

Your Honor, I am going to object.

As I

indicated before, I am not holding this witness out as an expert.
THE COURT:

You are now beyond the scope of cross-examination.

The objection is sustained."

[R. 940-941].

It is obvious the court not only allowed damaging and prejudicial testimony that was not relevant; but the court also
refused to allow counsel for the plaintiff to deal effectively in
cross-examination with the matter brought up by Mr. Burns.

If

Mr. Burns was permitted to testify that he had "never been aware of
a private club having a security agency provided for security in
private clubs," it would certainly appear to be proper on crossexamination to delve into security agencies, types of security
guards, equipment and uniforms used, etc.

If Mr. Burns wasn't famil-

iar with the equipment used by security personnel, he may not have
recognized the security men, even if they were present in the clubs.
Since counsel for the defendants admitted Mr. Burns was not
being produced as an expert witness, and since the court did not
allow his testimony to come in to show "custom, usage, or practice"
within the trade, there would be no basis for admitting the testimony.

By allowing it to be introduced, especially without caution-

ary remarks or instructions, the jury might have believed they were
bound by the testimony to find that since no security agencies were
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used in other private clubs, none should have been used by the
Beehive Lodge of Elks.

Since William Gately had been denied the

right to testify on these matters, it was clearly prejudicial to
allow James Burns to so testify.

POINT IV

. •••-•V,

THE TRIAL JUDGE COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN REFUSING TO
ASK CERTAIN QUESTIONS WHICH WERE REQUESTED BY THE PLAINTIFF IN
CONNECTION WITH THE VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION OF PROSPECTIVE JURORS.
Before the court questioned the panel of prospective jurors
at the beginning of the trial, the plaintiff submitted to the court
the "PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED QUESTIONS FOR VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION OF
PROSPECTIVE JURORS."

[R. 216-218].

The court refused to give

questions nos. 9, 14, and 15 and indicated his refusal by marking
"NO" in the lefthand margin of the said request.

The plaintiff sub-

mits that by refusing to ask the questions nos. 9, 14, and 15, the
trial judge

denied the plaintiff a jury trial in that plaintiff was

not allowed to determine the prejudices, feelings, background, and
experience of the jury in connection with certain matters, and there
fore could not properly use his challenges for cause nor his preemptory challenges.
Question no. 9 [R. 217] reads as follows:

"Do any of you,

members of your immediate family, or close relatives now or have any
of you in the past had the duty of processing or receiving claims
for the company for which you worked or do now work?"

The plaintiff

submits if the prospective jurors had in fact worked in businesses
which involved their processing or receiving claims, that they may
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have developed a certain callousness, philosophy, or prejudice toward those who file claims against other parties, and
may have harbored some resentment against the plaintiff in
the instant action for filing his claim against the defendants.
Had any of the jurors answered in the affirmative to this
question, plaintiff's counsel could have pursued this matter
to determine any bias or prejudice.
The plaintiff bases his appeal on these grounds upon
the cases of Keirnan v. Van Schaik, 347 F.2d 775 (1965) and
Crawford v. Manning, Utah, 542 P.2d 1091 (1975).
Questions numbers 14 and 15 requested by the plaintiff
also went to the question of whether any women on the jury
would have children at home that would require them to be
there at a particular time and whether any of the members of
the jury would have appointments or schedules that required
their presence some place else so they would be inconvenienced
in the event the jury should be delayed in their deliberations
until some late or unusually late hour in the evening or night
because the trial may take several days.

Again, the plaintiff was

entitled to find out whether the jurors would have been able
to give their full and complete attention to this case or
whether they would have other commitments or responsibilities
that would be on their minds to make it impossible for them
to fairly evaluate the evidence.
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POINT V

THE TRIAL JUDGE COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR BY GIVING
INSTRUCTIONS NUMBERS 18, 32, 33, 34, 35, AND 36, AND BY REFUSING
TO GIVE PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTIONS NUMBERS 14, 15, 23,
AND 26.
The specific instructions which the plaintiff objects to
with the page number of the record where they may he found are as
follows:

No. 18 [R. 180]; No. 32 [R. 194]; No. 33 [R. 195]; No. 34

[R. 196]; No. 34 [R. 197]; and No. 36 [R. 198].

The plaintiff made

timely objections to the court giving the foregoing instructions.
[R. 950-953], and set forth the reasons for the objections which
reasons are by reference incorporated herein and made a part hereof
at this time.
Plaintiff also objected to the trial judge's refusal to give
Plaintiffs Requested Instructions Nos. 14 [R. 99]; 15 [R. 100];
23 [R. 108]; and 26 [R. 111]. Proper exceptions were taken to the
failure of the court to give these proposed instructions.

[R. 950]

Plaintiff's proposed Instruction No. 14 [R. 99] was a necessa
part of the instruction on negligence to appraise the jury of the
fact that "the greater the danger which is known or is reasonably
to be anticipated, the greater is the degree of care which is required to be observed."

In the instant case, it is clear if the ju

had found the Beehive Lodge of Elks and/or its officers should have
anticipated fightings and/or shootings might occur during the New
Year's Eve Celebration, this would have imposed on them a greater
degree of care than if they had not so found. 2 Harper & James Tort
(1956) §16.9 p. 931.
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Instruction No. 15 [P. 100] was based on the general law
found in 57 Am. Jur. 2d Negligence, pp. 411-412 §59 "Anticipation
of Some Harm Is Sufficient."

Otherwise, the jury might have felt

the lodge was not negligent unless it could have anticipated the
exact shooting which occurred involving Scott and Gray.
Plaintiffs proposed Instruction No. 23 [R. 108], dealt with
the status of Anderson Pearson and other volunteer members of the
Elks Club who provided the security during the New Year's Eve
Celebration.

The testimony by the lodge witnesses revealed there

were no hired security personnel on the premises; and any security
was provided by volunteer members of the lodge.

The inference

would be that the volunteers were held to a lower standard of care
than if hired security guards had been employed.

Plaintiff's pro-

posed Instruction No. 23 [R. 108] was an instruction to the jury that
even though Anderson Pearson may have been an unpaid volunteer member of the club while providing security, the law imposes an obligation upon everyone who attempts to do something for another even
gratuitously to exercise ordinary care and skill in the performance
of what he has undertaken.

57 Am. Jur. 2d Negligence 424 §74

"Performance of Duty Voluntarily and Gratuitously Undertaken."
Without this instruction, the jury may have felt Anderson Pearson
would have been held to a lower standard of care in providing
security than a hired security guard would be.

>

Plaintiff's proposed Instruction No. 26 [R. Ill] was discussed under POINT I, above.
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CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the plaintiff submits the
cumulative effect of these prejudicial errors committed by the
trial judge, effectively denied the plaintiff his right to a jury
trial as guaranteed by the constitutions of the United States and
the State of Utah; and this case should be remanded for a new tria
on all of the issues raised against the defendants Beehive Lodge
of Elks #407, and its officers, trustees and agents.

In the

event a new trial is ordered, the plaintiff also requests this
court to decide all of issues raised on appeal as an aid to the
.*. ; -.. ,,

parties and the trial judge.
- ;i,
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